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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: 
CHINA’S PROTECTIONIST REGULATIONS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IMPLEMENTED IN THE MONTHS BEFORE 
COMPLETING WTO ACCESSION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The People’s Republic of China attracted the equivalent of $72 billion 
U.S. in foreign direct investment in 20051 and $60 billion U.S. in 2004.2 
China draws more foreign investment than any other developing nation,3 
due largely to investor confidence in China’s economic reforms 
implemented after it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.4 
From its December 11, 2001 accession,5 China had five years to reform its 
markets to a state of compliance with the WTO agreement.6 China’s 
obligation to the WTO requires policy changes that will allow foreign firms 
to enter the Chinese marketplace and compete fairly with domestic firms.7 
While joining the WTO and engaging in further global commerce is 
important to Chinese officials8—and was the long-range intention of Deng 
Xiaoping’s opening-up of China in 19799—there is still trepidation in the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Geoff Dyer, Opportunity in East China, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, (FT Report: Business 
of Consulting), at 2. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Andrew Baston & Mei Fong, In a Strategic Shift, China Hits Foreign Investors With New 
Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at A1. 
 4. See generally John I. Gordon & Xuhua Huang, The New Climate for International 
Investment in China: Key Reforms Open Up China’s Financial Services, Venture Capital, and 
Logistics Sectors, 26 LOS ANGELES LAW. 12 (Nov. 2003) (discussing how regulations 
implemented between China’s WTO accession announcement and 2003 were designed to increase 
foreign investors’ ease of entry into the Chinese market, and led to increased capital inflow to 
China). 
 5. Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). 
 6. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations 
on China’s Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (summarizing the commitments that China must undertake to complete 
accession); Hong Kong Trade Dev. Council, China’s Accession to the WTO, Embracing the 
Opportunities, Meeting the Challenges, http://mas.tdctrade.com/mas/doc/www.tdctrade.com/ 
wto/tid.htm#2h (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (listing the schedule for reform that China must abide 
by with regard to the banking industry). 
 7. WTO Ministerial Conference, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol on China’s Accession]. See also sources 
cited supra notes 5, 6. 
 8. Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 1469 (2000) (articulating the details of China’s WTO accession). 
 9. William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China’s 
Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 477, 478 (2002). In 
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domestic Chinese business community about the increased competition 
from foreign firms that the WTO-compliant policies will allow.10 Several 
domestic Chinese industry groups have vocalized their fear of competition 
by explicitly seeking government protections from foreign competitors.11 
The government has answered that pressure with subsequent regulation 
reflecting a desire to “soften the impact of foreign competition.”12 
The year 2006 should have been another year of unprecedented 
investment in China, particularly by firms poised to take advantage of the 
WTO-compliant open markets. Instead, regulators blocked foreign 
acquisitions and cobbled together a maze of new regulations which may 
ultimately deprive Chinese domestic businesses of the capital and 
management expertise they require to compete with foreign firms in the 
long run. 2006 may be remembered as the year that Chinese regulators 
made a dangerous trade-off, swapping the long-term sustainability of 
domestic firms in the open Chinese market for a few regulatory roadblocks 
that assuaged the protectionist fears of those firms. 
Even before the five-year period of reform allowed by the WTO 
agreement had expired,13 foreign firms began to enter the domestic Chinese 
market and even more made plans to enter after WTO accession was 
completed,14 at least as players under their own brand names or as equity 
holders in existing Chinese ventures.15 It is no surprise that non-Chinese 
businesses want to position themselves for greater access to the 1.3 billion-
person market,16 but this goal has not been easily achieved.17  
Foreign firms in retail industries favor two ways of gaining greater 
access to the Chinese market: (1) acquiring Chinese businesses with 
existing infrastructure and licensing in place;18 or (2) establishing individual 
                                                                                                                 
1978 Deng Xiaoping adopted the “open door” policy, a series of reforms designed to speed up the 
growth of China’s economy through the use of foreign capital. Id. 
 10. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 11. Id. See also China’s Foreign Investment Rules to Hurt WVAS Providers, Financial Times 
Information Ltd. Asia Intelligence Wire, July 28, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2007). 
 12. Mure Dickie, China Issues Rules for Foreign Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at 8. 
 13. Mure Dickie, More Than 10 Foreign Banks to Open China Subsidiaries, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 
20, 2006, at 8. The anniversary of accession and deadline for compliance was December 11, 2006. 
 14. Id. (listing banks that anticipate entering Chinese market after November 2006). See Karen 
Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B.C. COMP. 
L. REV. 319, 338–39 (2004) (discussing banks that entered Chinese banking market in the period 
between WTO commitment and completion of accession). 
 15. Halverson, supra note 14, at 338. 
 16. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 114 (CIA 2006), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 17. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 18. Kate Linebaugh, Wal-Mart to Buy Grocer-Retail Chain in China—Deal Would Bolster 
Position in Crucial Overseas Markets After Missteps Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2006, at 
A3. In October 2006 Wal-Mart beat the French grocer Carrefour SA in the purchase of Trust-
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branches on the ground under the existing foreign brand name. However, 
the process of acquiring Chinese businesses grew increasingly difficult 
when the Ministry of Commerce issued new regulations relating to mergers 
and acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign investors (the 2006 
Regulations) in August 2006.19 The 2006 Regulations, which took effect on 
September 8, 2006, supersede the Provisional Regulations promulgated in 
April 2003.20 They include an anti-monopoly probe for large transactions,21 
provisions to protect “national economic security,”22 and channels for 
domestic Chinese businesses to intervene and stall acquisitions of their 
Chinese competitors by foreign-owned firms.23 While Chinese officials 
have insisted that their enthusiasm for foreign investment has not soured,24 
the 2006 Regulations, and their potential to restrict foreign acquisitions, 
certainly reflect otherwise.25 
Because the WTO guidelines do not allow members to explicitly 
prohibit foreign entrants to their markets,26 the 2006 Regulations carefully 
provide only the discretion to exclude foreign investment, rather than any 
                                                                                                                 
Mart, a large Taiwanese grocery chain with 100 branches across China. The deal has not met 
approval by Chinese regulators, but Wal-Mart’s strategy to acquire ready-made outlets instead of 
building from the ground up is clear. Wal-Mart’s play for Trust-Mart branches is recognized as a 
continuation of Wal-Mart’s global trend of making acquisitions of local retailers as well as an 
example of a “[non-Chinese] company[y being] on the hunt for acquisitions” because “getting 
approvals to open new stores can be a slow process.” Id. Carrefour SA was still determined to 
make a name for itself in the Chinese marketplace; a Chongqing outlet of the supermarket chain 
was the site of a violent stampede for discounted cooking oil that killed three people and injured 
31. Jamil Anderlini, Stampede at China Supermarket Kills Three, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at 8. 
 19. Provisions for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises (Decree of the Ministry of 
Commerce, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council, State Administration of Taxation, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Administration of Foreign Exchange), Aug. 8, 
2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006), translated at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2006 Regulations]. The title of the law is sometimes translated as the 
Interim Provisions on the Takeover of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors. See id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at art. 51. 
 22. Id. at art. 12. 
 23. Id. at art. 51 (allowing third parties to call for a review of the transaction). 
 24. Zhong Ming, New Policy Ensures Better Investment Climate, FIN. TIMES ASIA 
INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Nov. 19, 
2007). Vice Premier Wu Yi is said to have “confirmed the government’s stance that China 
remains unchanged in its attitude towards foreign direct investment. What is more, she stressed, 
the country is determined to open the door even wider.” Id. The article, written by a Chinese 
journalist under a pen name, goes on to mention U.S. Congressional actions to stymie Dubai Ports 
World takeover of U.S. port operations as an example of foreign investment restrictions in the 
name of national security. 
 25. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 26. See Carol G. Liu, New and Foreign Banking Markets: Scaling the Great Wall: An Analysis 
of Foreign Banks’ Entry into China, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 397, 403 (2005). 
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overt exclusion.27 Before the Regulations became effective, China shielded 
domestic industries from competition without violating WTO principles by 
bureaucratically stalling several acquisitions of its domestic firms.28 In 
2006, the last year before full WTO compliance,29 Chinese bureaucrats 
wordlessly delayed or ended a number of pending transactions.30 In early 
2006, the Chinese investment landscape was dotted with several high 
profile foreign-proposed private equity transactions. For example, the 
Carlyle Group (Carlyle), an American private equity firm, bid $375 million 
for control of Xugong Construction Machinery (Xugong), a leading 
Chinese producer of heavy machinery equipment.31 Citigroup and U.K. 
private equity firm CVC Capital Partners formed a joint venture to purchase 
30 percent of China’s Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd. for about 
$625 million.32 Citigroup led a separate consortium that bid approximately 
$3 billion for an 85 percent stake in Guangdong Development Bank, a 
troubled midsize bank in southern China.33  
As of October 2006, Chinese regulators had not permitted any of these 
transactions.34 The Xugong deal awaited approval by Chinese government 
ministries for one year before Carlyle shrunk its proposal to a non-
controlling share.35 Meanwhile, CVC abandoned its efforts to purchase part 
of Shandong Chenming Paper36 and bids for a stake in Guandong 
Development Bank are now limited to more conservative proposals for non-
controlling shares.37 Each of these transactions awaited approval for several 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See generally, 2006 Regulations, supra note 19 (setting standards for review of foreign 
investment transactions and not calling for exclusion of foreign investment). 
 28. Linebaugh, supra note 18; Mariko Sanchanta, JFE Indefinitely Delays China Investment, 
FIN. TIMES (TOKYO), Sept. 21, 2006. Acquisition of established Chinese firms is a popular way 
for foreign retail businesses to enter China because the time consuming and highly political work 
to establish local branches and licenses is completed. In manufacturing and natural resources 
industries, acquisition of Chinese refining and manufacturing plants is favored for the same 
reason; building a plant from the ground up has proven difficult and impossible for non-Chinese 
businesses. The Japanese steel manufacturer JFE spent two years negotiating with Chinese 
regulators in a failed attempt to gain approval to build a blast furnace in China. In JFE’s case, 
locating a furnace in China would have streamlined the steel manufacturer’s operations because 
the furnace would refine steel mined in Western China. Id. 
 29. Understanding the WTO, supra note 5. 
 30. Chinese Deals, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms; China’s 
Chenming Scraps Sale of Stake to Citigroup Venture, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2006, at C5. Carlyle’s 
acquisition of Xugong Construction Machinery fell through; Citigroup and CVC Capital Partners 
deal to purchase a paper maker was scrapped; and Citigroup’s investment in Guangdong 
Development Bank shrank in 2006. Id. See also Battle for Rare Prize, infra note 33. 
 31. Chinese Deals, supra note 30; Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30. 
 32. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30. 
 33. Citigroup and Societe Generale Battle for Rare Prize in China – Warts and All, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 8, 2006, at C1. 
 34. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30; Battle for Rare Prize, supra note 33. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30. 
 37. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
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months38 and then fizzled just as the Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued 
the 2006 Regulations in August.39 
While these barriers to foreign investors may have comforted domestic 
firms dreading greater competition in the new open Chinese marketplace, 
this note asserts that the 2006 Regulations ultimately will be detrimental to 
these domestic firms. Section II considers the background for the Chinese 
sentiment against foreign investment in the period between WTO accession 
and full compliance, the current climate of “economic nationalism,” and the 
manifestation of this climate in industry requests for protection. Section III 
argues that regulators answered the protectionist requests when they refused 
to approve transactions in 2006, and looks specifically at the 2006 
Regulations against the backdrop of prior Chinese regulations on foreign 
investment. Section IV asserts that the 2006 Regulations, muddled in the 
overlap between centralized ministries and provincial governments, do not 
contribute to a legal regime that will sustain a healthy Chinese marketplace. 
Section V contends that since many domestic firms are still young, corrupt, 
inefficient and only recently independent from the state,40 they actually 
need foreign investment and management expertise in order to compete 
with the new entrants to the Chinese marketplace. A look at the retail 
banking sector illustrates this point. 
Chinese regulators should have spent 2006 courting the foreign 
investment that would help Chinese businesses attract the capital, 
technology and managers necessary to compete against established 
international firms. Not only will Chinese firms need foreign money and 
expertise to compete around the world, they will also need help at home 
when international firms are allowed to vie for a share of the domestic 
Chinese market that Chinese firms previously held captive. Instead, Chinese 
regulators slowed the influx of foreign dollars, just when Chinese firms 
needed it most, leaving them vulnerable to lose domestic market share and 
ill-prepared to compete internationally. 
II. CHINA’S OBLIGATIONS TO THE WTO AND ECONOMIC 
NATIONALISM 
In 2006, a Chinese business school professor observed: “It’s a 
comfortable time to get tougher with foreigners, having more of them hang 
around is not a top priority.”41 This describes the sentiment held by many of 
the Chinese business and industry leaders who have watched the growth of 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Chenming Scraps Sale, supra note 30; Battle for Rare Prize, supra note 33. 
 39. 2006 Regulations, supra note 19. 
 40. Jack E. Jirak, Equity Investment in Chinese Banks: A Doorway into China’s Banking 
Sector, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 329, 339 (2006) (noting that the “Big Four” Chinese commercial 
banks were owned by the government until very recently). 
 41. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
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China’s economy over the last five years. Even though foreign investment 
has helped the Chinese economy grow, especially between China’s WTO 
accession in 2001 and the completion of obligations in 2005,42 the increase 
in foreign control has received backlash in the form of requests for 
protectionist regulation.43 Beijing has reacted by delaying proposed 
acquisitions (like the Xugong, Shangdong and Guangdong transactions) and 
through political moves, most notably the removal of the Mayor of 
Shanghai, who many believe had gone too far in courting foreign 
investment.44 Additionally, China has come under scrutiny from the U.S. 
and other nations for artificially setting its currency, the Renminbi (RMB), 
at a low price.45 China’s reluctance to see the RMB appreciate may also be 
perceived as protectionism and contribute to a backlash holding up the flow 
of foreign capital into China. 46 
A. CHINA’S OBLIGATIONS TO THE WTO 
China’s obligations to the WTO include opening markets for services 
and products and accepting the WTO rules by revising Chinese law to 
accommodate them.47 These changes had to be in place within five years of 
accession, which imposed a December 11, 2006 deadline.48 Since the 
accession, restrictions on domestic sales by foreign firms have been 
eliminated and thus, foreign firms have taken an increased market share.49 
This did not go unnoticed; domestic enterprises have demanded a balance 
between protection for Chinese business interests and incentives for 
introduction of foreign capital.50 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Dyer, supra note 1 (noting foreign direct investment influx between 2001 and 2005). 
 43. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 44. Clay Chandler, China Takes a Break, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2006, at 8; James T. Areddy, 
Shanghai Probe Hasn’t Finished, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A8 (“Analysts attributed Mr. 
Chen’s downfall in part to the fact that he pursued development policies out of step with those 
pushed by Beijing.”). 
 45. Steven R. Weisman, Paulson Says China Hurts Itself With Economic Policies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at C3. U.S. Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsay Graham have indicated 
that they will pursue legislation taxing U.S. imports from China if Beijing does not take action to 
unfix the rate of the RMB that they say is “artificially low.” Id. 
 46. See generally id. (discussing U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s observation that the 
same Chinese protectionism that was preventing China from opening up to competition was 
causing reactionary protectionism in the U.S. and may ultimately lead to backlash from other 
economic stakeholders in the Chinese economy). 
 47. Weitseng Chen, Legal Implications of a Rising China: WTO: Time’s Up for Chinese Banks 
— China’s Banking Reform and Non-Performing Loan Disposal, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 239 (2006). 
(stating that China has to open its banking market to foreign competition and is engaging in 
banking reform); JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC 
REFORM 319 (2005) 
 48. WU, supra note 47, at 320; Understanding the WTO, supra note 5. 
 49. WU, supra note 47,at 307. 
 50. Id.; Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
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B. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM 
Some investors worry that once China fulfills most of its obligations to 
the WTO at the end of 2006, it will take an increasingly protective stance 
through regulation, shielding domestic firms from competition from and 
acquisition by foreign groups with further roadblocks and ambiguous 
regulatory hurdles.51 Such protective measures have already been explicitly 
requested by some industry groups.52 
1. Government Actions Towards Economic Nationalism 
Keeping the RMB low compared to the U.S. dollar allows Chinese 
exports to be marketed abroad at artificially low prices and keeps imports 
into China relatively more expensive than domestically produced 
products.53 Non-Chinese businesses worry that, once the Chinese market is 
fully open to foreign products, those goods imported into China will be 
prohibitively expensive for the Chinese consumer because of the RMB’s 
low value.54 This would enable domestic Chinese firms to maintain a large 
market share in consumer industries. While the value of the RMB is set by 
Beijing,55 national ministries as well as local economic development 
regulators have a hand in foreign investment regulation.56 
Chen Laingyu was removed as the Secretary of Shanghai’s Communist 
Party, the highest official role in Shanghai in September 2006. Beijing cited 
a pension scandal as the reason for his termination.57 However, Mr. Chen’s 
removal is considered to be a message from Beijing that local officials will 
no longer be allowed to approve foreign investment projects at the rate 
achieved by Shanghai’s local government.58 Indeed, Shanghai is the center 
of Chinese operations for over 120 foreign companies, all approved by local 
administrators.59 While Mr. Chen did not set foreign investment policy in 
his role, his removal suggests that Beijing will not tolerate local officials 
deviating from the national foreign investment policy.60 Two weeks after 
Mr. Chen’s dismissal, the Ministry of Commerce issued its first Five-Year 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Tao Jingzhou, Why China Must Turn Away from Economic Nationalism, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 
15, 2006, at 15. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Weisman, supra note 45. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 57. Chandler, supra note 44; Areddy, supra note 44. 
 58. James T. Areddy, China Sacks Shanghai Official–Beijing Pushes to Tighten Control, 
Consolidate Power Amid Corruption Scandal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at A8. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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Plan on Commerce, featuring a plan to centralize foreign investment policy 
and remove it from the hands of local officials.61 
2. Private Businesses’ Requests for Protection 
Some industry sectors have asked for protection from foreign 
investment or from the entrance of foreign firms into the Chinese market.62 
Retailers have successfully lobbied for a rule restricting the expansion of 
large-scale chain stores.63 Soybean processors have asked for restrictions on 
the expansion of foreign firms in the industry.64 Chinese auto-makers have 
received a boost in the form of vague regulations demanding that foreign 
firms with manufacturing plants in China also make vehicles under local 
brand names.65 The Chinese bearings industry has publicly opposed the 
potential acquisition of Luoyang Bearing Group by Schaeffler, a German 
bearings manufacturer.66 A cement industry group asked regulators to 
review any foreign acquisition of a cement firm in excess of $100 million 
U.S. dollars.67 Members of the telecom industry asked the Ministry of 
Information for enhanced rules banning domestic telecom agencies from 
selling or leasing their licenses to foreign firms.68 Chinese regulators have 
considered steel a special strategic industry.69 In 2005 Beijing announced 
that foreign firms cannot purchase controlling shares of domestic steel 
companies.70 In this announcement, regulators revealed their plans to 
continue architecting the steel industry even after opening the market 
according to WTO obligations.71 These concessions to the industry groups 
illustrate the nimble and responsive style of Chinese economic regulators 
when presented with requests. Though the noted examples are small-scale 
and industry-specific, they begin a precedent that could allow broader 
protections if translated to a larger scale. 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Local Officials May Face Less Pressure on Foreign Investment Invitation, XINHUA ECON. 
NEWS SERVICE (BEIJING), Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Nov. 19, 
2007). 
 62. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 63. Id.; China Drafting Rules to Regulate Large-Scale Shopping Outlets, NEWS GUANGDONG, 
July 17, 2006, available at http://www.newsgd.com/business/laws/200607170045.htm. The 
Ministry of Commerce drafted a rule restricting both domestic and foreign “big box” retailers 
from building stores over 10,000 square feet without undergoing a rigorous approval process. Id. 
 64. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Rules to Hurt, supra note 11. 
 69. Shu-Ching Chen, No Steel for Foreigners in China, DAILY DEAL, July 21, 2005. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.; Sanchanta, supra note 28. The plan proposed consolidation, a more efficient coastal 
relocation of the production locations, and mergers that would give the top-10 producers a 50 
percent share by 2010 and a 70 percent share by 2020. 
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C. CASE STUDY: CARLYLE GROUP’S ATTEMPTED ACQUISITION OF 
XUGONG MACHINERY 
Carlyle’s attempted play for Xugong Machinery and the unorthodox 
approval process thus far is an example of the unpredictable regulatory 
climate hindering the influx of foreign capital. Xugong Group Construction 
Machinery Co. is China’s leading construction-equipment machinery 
maker.72 The local government of Xuzhou started a public auction process 
to sell Xugong in 2004; a deal giving Carlyle an 85 percent stake for $375 
million U.S. (3 billion RMB) was announced in November 2005.73 That 
deal had not been approved by October 2006.74 While the proposal was 
languishing, industry protections and national rules governing foreign 
acquisition were introduced, codifying concern over the strong market 
position of foreign firms.75 Even without regulatory precedent, the 85 
percent proposal was stalled in the approval queue as a handful of 
government ministries offered opinions.76 An unprecedented meeting was 
held between several ministries of the Chinese government specifically to 
discuss the buyout of Xugong.77 Since the proposal, the machinery industry 
has lobbied for and received specific protection.78 In June 2006, a 
government document declared that the heavy machinery industry would 
receive special protection as a “pillar” of the domestic economy, and the 
rule includes a provision for extra scrutiny of foreign acquisitions.79 In 
October 2006 Carlyle revised their agreement with Xugong, shrinking the 
sale to $230 million U.S. for a 50 percent share. The remaining 50 percent 
will stay in control of the Xuzhou government.80 
It seems counterintuitive that 2006 brought calls for restrictive 
regulation from Beijing and Chinese industry groups after foreign 
investment had helped the Chinese economy grow so much in the last 
decade.81 However, the shift to restrictive regulation probably occurred in 
2006 because the deadline was approaching for completion of China’s 
WTO obligations.82 The pace of foreign investment between 2001 and 2006 
was rapid and continued even without a predictable legal framework for 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Shu-Ching Chen, China Slows Foreign Industrial Acquisition, DAILY DEAL, July 3, 2006. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Andrew Baston & Laura Santani, Carlyle Scales Back Planned Stake in China Firm, 
WALL ST. J., Oct.18, 2006, at A12. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Beijing Holds Meeting to Discuss Carlyle-Xugong Deal, CHINA KNOWLEDGE NEWSWIRE, 
Aug. 3, 2006, available at http://www.chinaknowledge.com/news/news-detail.aspx?id= 
3883&cat=general. 
 78. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Baston & Santani, supra note 74. 
 81. Baston & Fong, supra note 3. 
 82. Understanding the WTO, supra note 5. 
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foreign investors.83 The rate of transactions also increased significantly 
between 2001 and 2005 along with the price of individual deals.84 A 
timeline of investment in the retail banking sector demonstrates this: in 
2003, Citigroup’s $72 million U.S. investment in Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank was a landmark.85 By 2004 that investment was 
overshadowed by the $1.75 billion U.S. share of the Bank of 
Communications that Hong Kong Singapore Banking Corporation (HSBC) 
purchased.86 The year 2005 saw even more deals in the banking sector, with 
Bank of America taking a $2.5 billion U.S. position in China Construction 
Bank87 alongside Temasek’s $2.4 billion U.S. position in the same bank.88 
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) sold a 10 percent 
position to Goldman Sachs and other investors for $3.5 billion later in 
2005.89 
If Chinese regulators decided to restrict foreign transactions only after 
looking on as European90 and American investors took stakes in their 
formerly state-owned banks, they made an effective decision. Withholding 
approval from acquisitions and tightening regulations has already resulted 
in a decline in foreign investment. The January to August period in 2006 
saw a 2.1 percent decrease in foreign investment compared to the same 
months in 2005, and the pace continued to slow as the 2006 Regulations 
were announced.91 In August 2006 China received 8.5 percent less foreign 
investment than August 2005.92 
                                                                                                                 
 83. There is some speculation that foreign investors are so bullish about Chinese investment 
that they will not be deterred by any recent regulation, as evidenced by the pace of investment 
thus far, even without solid protections in place for foreign investors. Kate Linebaugh, Record 
China IPO Could Have Been Even Bigger — ICBC Offering Highlights Global Investors’ 
Appetite, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2006, at B3. If this were the case, then foreign investment would 
continue in sectors that allow it, so that the problem of foreign control would not be quelled, but 
industry-specific protections would keep foreign capital away from the sectors that need it most to 
compete. 
 84. Jirak, supra note 40, at 345–46 (outlining the 2003, 2004, and 2005 private equity 
investments in the banking sector). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. HSBC is a British corporation. About HSBC, http://www.hsbc.com/1/2/about-hsbc (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2007).  
 91. After Years of Courting Investment, Beijing May be Losing its Ardor for Capital, 
FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2006, at 16. 
 92. Id. 
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III. RECENT HISTORY OF CHINESE REGULATION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 2006 REGULATIONS 
September 2006 brought significant Ministry of Commerce regulations 
on foreign investment.93 The 2006 Regulations introduced a mandatory 
anti-monopoly probe if either party has large assets, high revenue in China, 
or a significant market share,94 and special scrutiny for transactions 
concerning “key industries” or “national economic security.”95 The 2006 
Regulations have been touted as the “most far-reaching legislation 
governing foreign takeovers” to date96 because they are the first such rules 
intended to be applied evenly across industry groups.97 The 2006 
Regulations came at the tail end of a period of regulatory relaxation for 
foreign investors.98 However, proposed transactions that trigger provisions 
in the 2006 Regulations will face much more intense scrutiny from the 
Ministry of Commerce than any prior regulation imposed.99 Those 
provisions allowing intensified scrutiny, and the bevy of more specific 
regulations in the past two years, signify an effort by Chinese policymakers 
to slow the rate of foreign investment through greater regulation than in the 
past. As of February 2007, the United States had requested that the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body look into the Chinese regulations as well as the 
system of taxes on foreign investors.100 No result was reached in the WTO, 
and most of the threats against Chinese regulators have come in the form of 
warnings or local legislation.101 
A. REGULATORY BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURAL OPTIONS FOR 
FOREIGN INVESTORS 
Foreign investors can be grateful for at least one aspect of the post-
WTO reforms: the potential for simplified structural options.102 By not 
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allowing mergers and acquisitions in the past, Chinese regulators have 
demanded that foreign operators use joint ventures and other mechanisms to 
tap the Chinese market.103 Even those regulations were changing every few 
months through the end of 2005. 
Often, investors in Chinese companies own shares in an offshore 
company and not the Chinese company directly.104 These wholly owned 
foreign entities (WOFEs), many of which are based in the Cayman 
Islands,105 are structured to allow investors to avoid Chinese taxes while 
they are invested.106 Because investment in WOFEs is structured as shares 
of the foreign holding company, it offers investors the appealing prospect of 
liquidity by allowing investment exits through US or other stock 
exchanges.107 In 2002 the WOFE form constituted 65 percent of all foreign 
investment in China.108 Some of the most famous successful exits from 
venture capital investments in China were listed on U.S. exchanges through 
the WOFE format.109 In January and April 2005 the State Administration 
for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued Circulars designed to rein in Chinese 
residents who had avoided taxes by owning Chinese investments through 
offshore entities.110 Circular 11 in January111 and Circular 29 in April112 
forbid any Chinese citizen or resident foreigner from starting or owning 
shares in an offshore company without government approval.113 As far as 
the private equity and venture capital community could see in August 2005, 
SAFE was not approving any proposed offshore investments by Chinese 
residents.114 The head of a public bank noted that, because of the fear of 
investing offshore and uncertainty about the standards for approval, venture 
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capital funding for offshore entities had almost ceased after SAFE Circulars 
11 and 29 were issued.115 In the period following those Circulars, private 
equity groups and their portfolio companies arranged financing based on 
unsupported agreements, and hoped that legal agreements and financing 
would materialize once the approval process got off the ground.116 In 
response to unrest about the uncertain state of equity transactions, SAFE 
issued Circular 75 on October 21, 2005, regarding Issues Relating to 
Financing through Offshore Special Purpose Vehicles by Domestic 
Residents and Round Trip Investment.117 Circular 75 upheld the authority of 
SAFE to approve transactions, but also eliminated the provision for 
Ministry of Commerce approval.118 
While transactions including offshore companies were being regulated 
in bits and pieces, domestic venture capital transactions were aided by 
national sweeping regulation designed to smooth the acquisition process. In 
November 2005 the National Development and Reform Commission 
announced that domestic venture capital would be regulated by a uniform 
set of regulations designed to make Chinese investors more competitive in 
the domestic venture capital landscape dominated by non-Chinese 
investors.119 Previously, domestic venture capital regulations varied by 
province.120 The November 2005 rules helped investors avoid being double-
taxed and announced government help through seed capital and incentive 
systems that award investment in certain industries.121 
The year-to-year policy changes,122 including the formation of SAFE, 
contributed to a generally unpredictable climate for foreign investment. The 
2006 Regulations on mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors were a 
similar surprise. Although the timing conveniently coincided with pending 
transactions that the government had been stalling, the tone of the 
Regulations was a marked contrast to the trend toward de-regulation that 
foreign investors had enjoyed since China’s WTO accession agreement. 
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B. SEPTEMBER 2006 ANTI-MONOPOLY PROBE 
Foreign acquisitions of Chinese-owned companies after September 8, 
2006 must undergo an anti-monopoly probe if either party has assets over 3 
billion RMB (about $404 million U.S. dollars in November, 2007), revenue 
inside China exceeding 1.5 billion RMB ($202 million U.S. dollars), or a 
Chinese market share over 20 percent.123 It is worth noting that a foreign 
acquiring company meeting these criteria will trigger the probe regardless 
of the size of the Chinese target. The probe will also be triggered if the 
foreign party has acquired more than ten related companies in China during 
the year.124 If none of those requirements are met, a relevant industry group, 
competing Chinese enterprise, or government department may petition the 
Ministry of Commerce for a hearing to determine whether the transaction 
could be anti-competitive.125 The Ministry then has 90 days to decide if a 
hearing is necessary, and then can begin evaluating the transaction for 
approval.126 
The 2006 Regulations also introduced a few special classes of Chinese 
corporations, the acquisitions of which will require special approval from 
the Ministry of Commerce.127 Transfer of a controlling interest in a Chinese 
company with a “famous brand name” or one in a “key industry” with an 
actual or potential effect on “national economic security” is included in this 
provision.128 The terms “famous brand name,” “national economic security” 
and “key industry” are not defined in the 2006 Regulations.129 This allows 
for substantial discretion by the administrators who decide which 
transactions trigger the provision. The 2006 Regulations do not offer 
guidelines and reporting standards for transacting companies to present 
their financial information or assessment of whether the transaction will 
affect a “key industry” or “national economic security.” To date no request 
for clarification or interpretation has been made to the National People’s 
Congress (NPC). 
The lack of guidelines may lead to uneven application of the regulation 
because it requires that transacting firms police themselves when 
determining whether they will trigger the anti-monopoly probe. Firms will 
not know whether to complete the probe or what type of inquiry will satisfy 
the regulation. The requirement on companies with a market share of 20 
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percent130 will be problematic for manufacturing companies that contribute 
products to several sectors. Furthermore, the benchmark of what is or is not 
a monopoly will vary between industries because the 2006 Regulations do 
not provide a clear definition of “famous brand name.”131 As there is no 
timeline or standard for the reporting and approval processes, prospective 
acquisitions could be stalled indefinitely. 
IV. THE CHINESE LEGAL CLIMATE FOR FOREIGN 
INVESTORS 
While China’s problems with adopting the rule of law132 have not 
impeded hungry investors thus far,133 how the 2006 Regulations affect 
domestic businesses and foreign investors will be a significant indicator of 
the sustainability of China’s post-WTO accession open marketplace. Recent 
announcements indicate that regulators understand that the legal 
implications for foreign investors could be clearer,134 but the process of 
truly centralizing the regulation of foreign investment in all industries and 
sectors may be too ambitious to expect consolidation in the near future.135 
Since Deng Xiaoping’s commitment to open China to the outside world 
in 1978,136 China’s legal regime has evolved from the dictatorship it was 
during Mao Zedong’s life, but not yet to the point of operating within the 
rule of law.137 “Rule of law” is a term generally used to describe legal 
systems where law has achieved the status necessary to impose “meaningful 
restraints on the State and individual members of the ruling elite.”138 
Besides lacking the authority that many western nations ascribe to their 
bodies of law, China’s body of law has been hallmarked by ambiguity.139 
While that was helpful to administrative ministries as they worked around 
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regulation to bolster state-owned businesses,140 the system of subjective 
regulations interpreted for each individual transaction would be impractical 
when the volume of foreign businesses operating in China increases, as it is 
expected to after WTO accession is completed.141 The stalling of the 
Xugong, Shangdong and Guangdong deals may have already demonstrated 
that wrangling approval from all the relevant ministries and agencies is time 
consuming and nearly impossible.142 
The history of the People’s Republic of China is brief143 and still in flux 
as the single-party communist government modernizes a body of law that 
has historically been an “ideological instrument of politics.”144 Chinese law 
comes from a variety of central, administrative, and provincial sources.145 
The most unique and troublesome source for recent investors has been the 
state council’s authority to issue tentative laws to control unprecedented 
situations.146 The NPC is the main body of lawmakers and their power in 
the central Chinese government is almost entirely unchecked.147 Members 
of the NPC elect the president of China, the head judicial leader, the heads 
of other departments and ministries, and enact laws.148 The NPC itself is a 
3,000-member body made of delegates chosen from the provincial 
congresses.149 Mechanisms for the selection of those provincial delegates 
and the composition of the NPC’s internal Standing Committee ensure that 
the membership of the NPC consists of approved Communist Party 
members.150 Although the NPC is empowered to administer regulations 
itself,151 it also elects the State Council, which oversees the ministries, 
commissions, bureaus, and local governments that make up most of China’s 
administrative regulators.152 These ministries and other bureaucratic bodies 
are granted the power to create administrative rulings as well.153 The 
Ministry of Commerce, which set many of the regulations on foreign 
investment, is included in those ranks.154 
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While the NPC serves as the root of power in the Chinese government, 
many avenues exist through which regulation may be handed down. This 
affects foreign investors when the approval of proposed transactions is 
delayed by the wide variety of policy-setting bodies that have the authority 
to speak on the transactions. The provision in the 2006 Regulations 
allowing a third party to call a hearing questioning a proposed foreign 
acquisition155 will certainly draw many more concerned private and 
bureaucratic parties into the approval process, and possibly result in even 
further delays. 
V. CHINESE BUSINESSES WILL NEED FOREIGN CAPITAL AND 
EXPERTISE TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE 
FOREIGN FIRMS THAT ARE EXPECTED TO ENTER 
CHINA’S MARKETPLACE  
While the regulations against foreign investment may not be an 
immediate death knell for them, domestic Chinese firms could certainly 
benefit from injections of expertise and capital while international firms are 
circling the 1.3 billion-person market, looking for a way to capitalize on 
it.156 In March 2007, the U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for 
International Trade, Frank Lavin, noted that the health of China’s domestic 
businesses would be aided by investment from foreign firms: “The 
controversy shouldn’t be Carlyle-Xugong . . . I think China needs 100 
Carlyle Groups to come in and buy 100 Xugongs.”157 Foreign investment 
would offer enhanced technology and more sophisticated management and 
marketing strategy to any sector, but the consumer financial services 
industry offers a ripe example. The domestic Chinese market for consumer 
banking is enormous, and the Chinese firms occupying the market have 
underperformed.158 This makes it an attractive market for successful and 
established foreign banks, like Citigroup, which have adopted a philosophy 
of “if you can’t buy ‘em, join ‘em” as they carve out a market share on their 
own after their attempts to invest in Chinese banks were rebuffed.159 If 
Chinese banks are not prepared to compete, they risk not only losing ground 
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at home, but ultimately failing to gain a significant share in the consumer 
banking market abroad. 
The banking industry is particularly affected by the recent regulatory 
developments because China’s largest banks were owned and run by the 
government until 2005 and 2006.160 The WTO obligations call for China to 
allow established foreign retail banks to open on the ground in China and 
market directly to Chinese consumers by the end of 2006.161 However, this 
can benefit the existing Chinese banks by offering expertise, particularly 
related to the limited scope of retail consumer products that have not been 
offered by the government-owned Big Four banks in the past.162 The 
number of proposed acquisitions in the retail banking market suggests that 
foreign banks prefer to make that connection by acquiring or joining with 
existing banks instead of forging ahead alone to break ground on 
completely new branches.163 The WTO obligations allow foreign banks to 
establish their own freestanding businesses in China, and if they are forced 
to do so without merging with or acquiring a Chinese bank, they will 
certainly offer the retail products popularized in western markets. Chinese 
banks will not be prepared to compete with them unless foreign expertise is 
employed in their product development management. 
Although the Big Four domestic Chinese banks have completed public 
offerings, there is some concern that Beijing will continue to manage the 
banking industry.164 Indeed, Beijing exhibited anxiety about the impending 
entrance of foreign lenders as far back as early 2005, when the vice-
chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission announced at the 
inaugural China Financial Reform Forum that “we need to focus on having 
an appropriate level of protection for Chinese banks.”165 At that point there 
was an implicit rule banning multinational banks from taking stakes in more 
than two Chinese banks, and in October 2006 the only foreign banks 
granted commercial-banking licenses were Citigroup Inc. and HSBC.166 
So far, government management of the banks has led to poor 
performance, allowing government officials to award loans at their personal 
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discretion to non-creditworthy recipients or without securing collateral.167 
However, government bail-outs have kept the bad loans from affecting the 
IPO prospects of at least one large bank, the ICBC.168 There, the percentage 
of non-performing loans was reduced from 34 percent to 5 percent in the 
last year when the bad loans were removed from ICBC’s books and shuttled 
to separate asset management companies.169 
ICBC has also benefited from the overall growth in the Chinese 
banking market, where deposits and personal and corporate loans have 
experienced double-digit increases each year since 2001.170 Since Chinese 
law has kept deposit rates low and lending rates higher, ICBC’s profits 
doubled between 2004 and 2006.171 ICBC’s public offering earned $21.9 
billion U.S., but it drew $350 billion U.S. in demand.172 While that figure is 
exciting, it is probably more an indicator of foreign investor excitement 
about claiming a stake in a large Chinese offering than the health of 
ICBC.173 To illustrate the increase in excitement, compare Goldman Sachs’ 
5.8 percent share of ICBC, for which they paid $2.6 billion U.S. in April 
2006,174 to the end of 2001, when all foreign investment in the Chinese 
banking and insurance industries totaled only $1.4 billion U.S.175 
The Chinese banking market does warrant such zeal by investors; it is 
growing even faster than the country’s economy, paced by the rise in 
personal wealth in China.176 The excitement over the industry’s growth and 
jealousy by investors who were not invited to ICBC’s offering have incited 
foreign investment in other banks as well, some with even less attractive 
portfolios than ICBC.177 
In late 2006, Morgan Stanley planned to acquire the Nan Tung bank, a 
one-branch operation dealing only with non-Chinese currencies.178 
Guangdong Development Bank in southern China may appear generally 
unattractive with $4.5 billion U.S. in bad loans, but it spurred a bidding war 
between Citigroup and Societe Generale, the French bank.179 Retail banks 
with such poor performance as Guangdong and such small market share as 
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Nan Tung would not normally be courted by multinationals. However, 
because the approval process for licensing in China is so ambiguous and 
local, the licensing that small banks have already obtained is attractive to 
foreign firms who are uncertain that they would be granted licenses as new 
entrants to the banking market. Guangdong also offers 501 existing 
branches and all the local and municipal licenses to operate them.180 
However, other potential foreign investors watched from the sidelines in 
2006 as big private transactions, like the bid for Guangdong, waited in 
limbo for approval from Chinese authorities.181 Chinese regulators seemed 
perfectly happy with the slowdown, even indicating that protecting the 
domestic banking industry’s market share starts with keeping foreign 
investors out of indigenous banks.182 
Despite the growth in the market for banking in China, experts believe 
that the sustainability of the domestic banking industry could benefit from 
an increased role for foreign entrants, and that fear over harm to existing 
indigenous banks (particularly the Big Four) is unwarranted.183 The 
presence of foreign banks was not threatening the market share of Chinese 
banks by the time of the 2006 Regulations. Further, a future increase in 
foreign bank outlets has the potential to help the domestic banking industry 
take advantage of consumer banking products that the Chinese market has 
not yet been exposed to.  In 2006, foreign banks operating in China were 
not occupying a significant share of the domestic retail market.184 A 2005 
survey of foreign banks by PriceWaterhouseCoopers showed that foreign 
banks operating in mainland China drew on a mostly non-Chinese customer 
base.185 Experience in Japan indicates that foreign banks will not steal away 
Chinese banking customers as they enter.186 When foreign banks first 
entered the market in Japan, domestic customers were not quick to switch 
their savings or borrowing to new banks.187 
The foreign banks surveyed anticipated growth in retail banking 
because Chinese customers have not been exposed to many products that 
have been successful in western markets.188 Credit cards, mortgages and 
investment vehicles have not been popularized by the current Big Four 
players in Chinese retail banking because they do not have the expertise to 
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develop and offer such products.189 Foreign entrants who have already 
developed retail products and have experience tailoring and marketing them 
may be better equipped to educate Chinese consumers and popularize the 
products first.190 Morgan Stanley’s Nan Tung acquisition is a good example 
of the pathway that foreign investors must take to make inroads into 
Chinese retail banking. It is a very small holding, but the commercial-
banking license is not currently available to foreign banks and is a 
necessary prerequisite to introducing and popularizing retail products and 
services such as credit cards and investment instruments in the Chinese 
market.191 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The sentiment from Chinese firms and industry groups requesting 
protection is understandable as the post-WTO open market will expose 
them to competition not only from foreign firms on their own soil, but also 
from the Chinese firms already backed by foreign capital or traded on 
public exchanges. However, the Chinese government has reacted by 
holding up foreign acquisitions and mandating time-consuming and vague 
reporting requirements through the 2006 Regulations. Such a reaction has 
merely quelled public unrest at the foreign economic presence and has not 
contributed to a legal regime that will foster efficient and competitive 
Chinese businesses in the open market. The health of Chinese enterprises 
will not be ensured just by slowing the flow of foreign capital and foreign 
acquisitions. As China’s WTO accession has brought its market into the 
open world economy, self-seclusion for Chinese businesses is no longer 
possible to sustain.192 Chinese private firms and the remaining state-owned 
enterprises will only suffer from excessive protection as they are closed off 
from the benefits of foreign management and capital. The problems will be 
particularly ironic and damaging for key industries, like banking, that have 
historically been hampered by inefficiency while leaving huge domestic 
Chinese markets untapped. 
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